

About 70,000 words

IDEAS TO DIE FOR

Lessons from the American Revolution for the War on Terrorism

by

Pat Proctor

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## OVERVIEW

It was an attack that shook the world, perpetrated on behalf of an ideology that threatened to destroy Western civilization. In response, the most powerful nation on Earth sent their unmatched military half way around the world to meet the threat. It should have been easy; they were facing an unorganized, undisciplined rabble. But the war soon devolved from conventional warfare into a bloody insurgency that ground on for year after agonizing year.

This was not the Global War on Terrorism or even the war in Iraq. The attack was the "shot heard round the world," the opening battle of the American Revolution. It was the mighty British Army that was frustrated by that "rabble," the army of the fledgling United States of America. Britain was trying to stop the idea of liberty, which threatened to shatter the old order of monarchy and nobility. In the end, the mighty British Empire was defeated, bankrupted, and nearly destroyed.

Today, America is the most powerful nation on Earth. It, too, was attacked by a dangerous ideology that threatens to destroy Western civilization--salifist jihadism. Just as Britain did over two centuries ago, America responded by sending its unmatched military half way around the world

to meet the threat. America, too, has found itself embroiled in stubborn insurgencies. Does humiliating defeat await the United States as well?

Pat Proctor is a US Army major who has served on the frontlines of the media war in Iraq. In addition to spending two years studying the media war for the Army, Pat was a key player in developing the communications strategy for General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker in Iraq in 2007. It is this unique perspective that Pat brings to *Ideas to Die for: Lessons from the American Revolution for the War on Terrorism*.

*Ideas to Die for* takes a completely fresh look at the war, as an ideological struggle in the information age, and finds insights from British failures in the American Revolution and British successes in its worldwide anti-slavery campaign. Because this book is at the same time a current affairs discussion, a historical study, and a study of the modern media, it has unique crossover appeal. It will appeal to foreign affairs and military enthusiasts, history buffs, and those interested in the media. Based on government occupational data and publicly available media-consumption statistics, the market for *Ideas to Die for* is at least 12 million people.

The Global War on Terrorism continues to be a popular topic for non-fiction books. In December 2007, five books on this topic were featured in Amazon's top 100 non-fiction books. Other topics covered in *Ideas to Die for* were also featured in this list. These include the Revolutionary War (two titles), slavery (two titles), and the global media (three titles).

America faces a strategic dilemma. Every battle it fights in the Middle East creates more terrorists and further radicalizes the Muslim world. Thomas P.M. Barnett (*The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century*) advocates reshaping the US military to better meet regional threats. James Jay Carafano and Paul Rosenzweig (*Winning the Long War: Lessons from the Cold War for Defeating Terrorism and Preserving Freedom*) advocate applying the Cold War era strategy of containment to the Middle East. *Ideas*

*to Die for* diverges from these works in that it examines the Global War on Terrorism not as a military confrontation, but as the most difficult of all strategic challenges: the struggle to stop an idea.

TIMELINE FOR COMPLETION

Pat is hard at work on the manuscript for *Ideas to Die for* and has already completed seven of its twelve chapters. The manuscript will be complete in June 2010.

## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major Pat Proctor (US Army) is an Iraq war veteran with 15 years of service in command and staff positions from Fort Hood, Texas to Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. He also spent three years training US Army officers in both conventional and counterinsurgency warfare at the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California. In 2007, Pat worked at the senior military headquarters in Iraq, fighting on the frontlines of the media war. During his tour, Pat was drafted to work as part of a handpicked, 20-man team which included such luminaries as Ambassador Robert Ford (US Ambassador to Algeria), Colonel H.R. McMasters (*Dereliction of Duty*), and Dr. Stephen Biddle (Council on Foreign Relations). This team was commissioned by General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker to create a new strategy for the war in Iraq. Pat worked with a State Department counterpart to write the vast majority of the current strategic communication plan for the war.

Pat has conducted multiple studies on the media war in Iraq for the US Army Command and General Staff College and the Center for Army Lessons Learned, including field work in Iraq. He has consolidated his findings from these studies in his first book-length manuscript, *Media War: The Media-Enabled Insurgency in Iraq*. Because Pat is convinced that, in order to win

the Global War on Terrorism, America must stop seeing it as a war and start treating it as a struggle for the mind of Islam, he has begun work on his next book, *Ideas to Die for: Lessons from the American Revolution for the War on Terrorism*.

Pat has written on current affairs and military history topics for the US Army War College journal, *Parameters*, and the consumer magazine, *Armchair General*. Pat has also published articles in *Military Simulations & Training* and the online magazines, *Wargamer.com* and *StrategyPage.com*.

Pat holds a bachelor's degree in Mechanical Engineering from Purdue University. He holds a master's degree in Military Arts for Strategy from the US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC). He also holds a master's degree in Military Arts for Theater Operations from the highly selective School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). He is currently a doctoral student in Security Studies at Kansas State University.

In addition to writing, Pat is also a prolific computer wargame developer and is very well known in the wargaming community. Shrapnel Games, Inc. publishes his six modern combat titles, but he does most of the marketing for these games himself. His marketing efforts have even drawn the attention of the defense industry; several of his titles have been licensed by corporations such as Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, Boeing, and Teknowledge for use in their own professional-grade simulations.

Finally, Pat is an occasional marathoner and borderline fitness fanatic. He lives in Manhattan, Kansas, near both Kansas State University and historic Fort Riley, with his wife, Aree, and their two children.

#### MARKETING PLAN

Pat Proctor has embarked on a one-man crusade to change the way America views warfare, media, and the Global War on Terrorism. His unique perspective on this topic and his breadth of experience in actually planning and fighting the media war have convinced him that change is essential if the United States is going to win the War on Terrorism. Pat sees *Ideas to Die for* not just as a commercial venture, but as an extension of his oath as a soldier to defend the United States. Pat is absolutely dedicated to making sure that *Ideas to Die for* reaches the widest possible audience.

First, Pat is willing to "put his money where his mouth is." Pat will match a publisher's out-of-pocket, consumer promotion budget up to one-third of his advance, upon signing and receipt of the advance. However, Pat is also going to actively market *Ideas to Die for* himself.

#### NATIONAL MEDIA

Throughout his military career, Pat has amassed a number of contacts in the national news media that he will be leveraging in order to market *Ideas to Die for*. During the author's work in media studies for the US Army, he met and talked with a number of nationally recognized journalists, including the

late John McWethy (ABC News), Steve Kamarrow (*Associated Press*), and Jane Araf (NBC). During his time in Iraq, Pat also met with syndicated columnists and writers such as Bing West (*No True Glory*) and Max Boot (*Savage Wars of Peace*). Over the course of his military career, Pat has also had contact with less well known writers for publications such as *Washington Post* and the *New York Times*. Pat will use these contacts to secure reviews and interviews for *Ideas to Die for*.

It is a grim but predictable trend that, as the US completes its withdrawal from Iraq with combat operations ending in August 2010, insurgents will increase the level of violence in order to influence the American and Iraqi political process. Past surges in violence has initiated a media debate about this so-called "Tet Offensive" tactic. Pat is a recognized authority in the field of military affairs and the media. He has been quoted in the past as an expert in the *New York Times* as well as numerous smaller publications. As *Ideas to Die for* nears completion, Pat will use this expert status to generate opportunities for interviews and on-air comment about the media war in Iraq.

#### THE WARGAMING MARKET

Pat will also leverage his standing in the wargaming community to market this book. This community is a great platform from which to market *Ideas to Die for*; it is a nexus of security professionals and military retirees, historians, and enthusiasts, all of whom buy and read books about war and history. The author has successfully marketed his computer wargames in this community for nearly a decade. As a result, his name is very well known and he has established himself not only as a great game developer, but also as an absolute authority on national security policy and military affairs.

The author maintains a Website for his commercial wargaming company ([www.prosimco.com](http://www.prosimco.com)) that is very well known in this community. In addition to information about his games, it also offers free game demos and multiplayer gaming support which draws between 30,000 and 50,000 hits per month. Pat has already expanded this Website to promote his work as a writer ([www.prosimco.com/writing](http://www.prosimco.com/writing)). He has also established a MySpace presence ([www.myspace.com/patproctor](http://www.myspace.com/patproctor)) and FaceBook page (<http://www.facebook.com/pages/Pat-Proctor/14992636843>) which support blogs and discussion forums that allow readers to interact with him, ask questions, and provide comment about his works.

Pat has written numerous articles for magazines such as *Armchair General* and *Wargamer.com* that cater to the wargaming community. Pat will submit a series of articles to these magazines on topics related to *Ideas to Die for* before and after publication. The author has also had his wargames reviewed and provided interviews in these and other magazines. As a result, Pat knows many of the writers for electronic gaming, wargaming, and simulation industry magazines. He will use these established contacts to garner reviews and interviews for *Ideas to Die for*.

Over nearly a decade of marketing to the wargaming community, pat has amassed contact information for over two thousand wargamers, service members, and defense and commercial gaming industry professionals. Pat also maintains an e-mail list for each of his games. Pat will use all of these tools to publicize *Ideas to Die for*. Pat will also promote *Ideas to Die for* by leveraging his frequent blog entries and forum posts on popular wargaming Websites in this community.

Not all of Pat's marketing efforts in the wargaming community will be behind the keyboard. Pat has twice appeared at the Origins Game Convention in Columbus, Ohio. He will return to promote *Ideas to Die for* after its publication.

## THE ACADEMIC MARKET

Pat is currently a doctoral student in security studies at Kansas State University. This university, in turn, has a strong relationship with the US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), where Pat recently completed two masters programs. His relationship with these two schools will give him the inside track toward getting the book included in courses at these institutions, as well as at the US Army War College. In addition to his contacts with professors and department heads at these schools, Pat has also been featured in some of their scholarly journals. He will use his previous publication in these journals to solicit reviews for *Ideas to Die for*. He also has two more articles directly related to the military and the media currently under consideration that will increase his visibility and credibility in this market.

## THE MILITARY MARKET

There is a great deal of interest in the topics discussed in this book across the military. Pat is a lifetime member of both the Association of the United States Army and the US Army Field Artillery Association and will leverage these memberships with the associations' magazines, the *Fires Bulletin* and *Army*, in order to secure a review of *Ideas to Die for* and potentially an interview. Pat will also secure reviews of *Ideas to Die for* in other prominent military journals.

## REGIONAL PROMOTION

Finally, Pat will work throughout the Midwest to promote *Ideas to Die for*. He has attended the Midwest Literary Conference (Fall, Aurora, Illinois) in the past and will seek to appear as a speaker at that conference after *Ideas to Die for* is published. There are also a number of other literary conferences in the Midwest, including the New Letters Writers Conference

(Summer, Kansas City, Missouri) and the Nebraska Summer Writer's Conference (Summer, Lincoln, Nebraska), at which Pat will seek to appear as a speaker. Pat will also canvass Kansas City radio stations for reviews and interviews and solicit area bookstores for readings and book signings. During his annual trip back to Fort Wayne, Indiana to visit family for the holidays, Pat will seek opportunities to do readings, radio and newspaper interviews, and book signings in Fort Wayne, Indianapolis, Detroit, and Cleveland as well.

## MARKET ANALYSIS

The total market for *Ideas to Die for: Lessons from the American Revolution for the War on Terrorism* is at least 12 million people. This book will appeal to anyone who wishes to better understand the Middle East and the terror war. However, this book has a crossover appeal that other books about the War on Terrorism lack--it will appeal to those interested in history or the media. While it has obvious practical application for historians as well as foreign policy, security, and media professionals, it is written for the layperson.

At least 10 million Americans are intensely interested in security issues in general and the Global War on Terrorism in particular. In a January 2008 NBC News/*Wall Street Journal* poll, 27 percent of Americans rated either the war in Iraq or terrorism as the most important issue facing the nation. This is reflected in America's media consumption habits. A rerun of the documentary *9/11* on CBS and the docu-drama *The Path to 9/11* on ABC together netted over 12.6 million viewers on 11 September 2006. Many of these people buy books and publications about the war. The *New York Times* bestseller *The Commission: The Uncensored History of the 9/11 Investigation* (Philip Shenon),

is just the most recent in a nearly unbroken string of bestsellers about Iraq, Afghanistan, or the Global War on Terrorism since 11 September 2001.

The military audience for *Ideas to Die for*--including active, reserve, recently separated, and retired service members--is 4.5 million people. This audience grows by 338,000 every year. This population is overwhelmingly male, middle class, and politically conservative with particularly strong negative feelings about the media (perceptions *Ideas to Die for* will challenge in an engaging way). The average age for service members is about 30, and virtually all are high school graduates. Most have at least some college. According to the Government Accounting Office, 20% have at least a bachelor's degree.

*Ideas to Die for* is also a historical account of the American Revolution and the British campaign against worldwide slavery. People continue to be fascinated about events and places related to the birth of America. For instance, over 1.6 million people visit the Liberty Bell and Independence Hall in Philadelphia each year. Slavery is an equally captivating topic in America. Over 4.4 million people went to theaters to see the DreamWorks picture, *Amistad*, about a rebellion on a slave ship in the nineteenth century. These topics also sell books. David McCullough's *1776* was the fourth highest selling book of 2005, with over 2.6 million copies in print of the original edition alone. The history of slavery also sells books. *From Slavery to Freedom* (John Hope Franklin and Alfred Moss) sold 3.5 million copies.

*Ideas to Die for* is also a book about the connection between the media and warfare. Americans continue to be fascinated by the role the media plays in war. For instance, the Barry Levinson movie, *Wag the Dog* made \$43 million in theaters and \$20 million in video sales, despite costing only \$15 million to make. This audience also buys books about the media and warfare; *In an Instant*, Bob Woodruff's book about his work as an ABC News journalist in Iraq, was a *New York Times* #1 bestseller.

The wargaming community is a small but important market for *Ideas to Die for* because it is a nexus of military professionals, enthusiasts, and historians. *Armchair General*, a magazine catering to this community, has a circulation of over 120,000. The author has deep roots in this community and will leverage them to market *Ideas to Die for*.

#### SPECIAL MARKETING OPPORTUNITIES

As a book written by an active duty service member, *Ideas to Die for* will almost certainly be a featured publication at the more than 3,500 post, base, and naval exchanges on military installations worldwide (including in Iraq and Afghanistan).

*Ideas to Die for* posits that the Global War on Terrorism cannot be won militarily. This controversial idea will make it a "must read" title for military professionals and required reading at military educational institutions such as the US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and in civilian security studies, international relations, and military history programs. The fact that the author is a recent attendee of CGSC and a doctoral student at Kansas State University (which maintains a close relationship with CGSC) makes this even more likely. Around 8,000 students pass through military schools each year. Kansas State University enrolls over 20,000 students each year. Each of these institutions also maintains a sizable library which will be interested in bulk orders.

The author is also a computer wargame developer. His games are published and distributed by Shrapnel Games, one of the largest Internet-based game publishers in the world. Shrapnel Games as well as other Internet-based game publishers will be very interested in selling *Ideas to Die for*. Many online wargaming magazines also maintain Internet store fronts and will wish to sell *Ideas to Die for* as well.

## COMPETING WORKS

Because this book spans a number of topics, from grand strategy in the Global War on Terrorism, through the history of the American Revolution and the anti-slavery movement, to the modern media, there is no single comparable work. There are, however, a few books that cover one or more of these topics.

*Ideas to Die for* is primarily a book about how to fight and win the Global War on Terrorism. The vast majority of books about the War on Terrorism focus on either Iraq or Afghanistan and are snapshots in time and space, examining one battle, one unit, one place, or one individual over a finite amount of time. Three prominent titles discuss grand strategy for the broader War on Terrorism:

- *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*, David Kilcullen (Oxford Press, 2009, 384 pages, \$27.95, *Washington Post* bestseller) examines the War on Terror as it is being waged by insurgents across the world, from North Africa to Thailand. He concludes that the United States and the West should approach these "small wars" with much more nuance and understanding.

- *World War IV: The Long Struggle Against Islamofascism*, Norman Podhoretz (Doubleday, 2007, 240 pages, \$24.95, #31 in "Current Events" at Amazon.com in December 2007) frames the war in terms of a struggle against "islamofascism" much like the struggle against fascism in the twentieth century.
- *The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America's Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11*, Ron Suskind (Simon & Schuster, 2006: multiple editions, 384 pages, \$24.95, *New York Times* #1 bestseller) tells the story of the War on Terrorism from the perspective of the CIA, FBI, and NSA and examines their struggle with the administration over strategy and execution.

These books describe the Global War on Terrorism as a military, foreign policy, or intelligence struggle. *Ideas to Die for* differs from these titles; it contends that this war is, in fact, a war for the mind of Islam.

Two historical events, the American Revolution and the British campaign to stamp out slavery, are discussed in detail in *Ideas to Die for*. The discussion of the American Revolution in *Ideas to Die for* focuses on the ideas of the independence movement and the British military response. Two recent, prominent books focus on these topics:

- *American Creation: Triumphs and Tragedies at the Founding of the Republic*, Joseph J. Ellis (Simon & Schuster, 2006: multiple editions, 400 pages, \$22.50, *New York Times* bestseller) studies the ideals of the revolution and how they clashed with politics in forming the republic.
- *1776*, David McCullough (Simon & Schuster, 2006: multiple editions, 400 pages, \$12.24, *New York Times* #1 bestseller) explores American and British actions in the first harrowing year of the Revolution.

*Ideas to Die for* also investigates the global slave trade, the justifications for slavery, and the success of the British anti-slavery movement. Two recent books touch on these topics:

- *Amazing Grace: William Wilberforce and the Heroic Campaign to End Slavery*, Eric Metaxas (HarperOne, 2007: multiple editions, 320 pages, \$13.95, four weeks as a *New York Times* bestseller) tells the story of British MP William Wilberforce, a key player in the British anti-slavery movement.
- *The Slave Ship: A Human History*, Marcus Rediker (Viking Adult, 2007, 448 pages, \$18.45) uses the experiences of slaves and traders aboard slave ships in the seventeenth and eighteenth century as a vehicle to discuss the West African slave trade.

These books are all excellent historical studies. However, *Ideas to Die for* goes a step beyond these works; it looks to the American Revolution and the British anti-slavery movement for insights into winning the Global War on Terrorism.

Finally, *Ideas to Die for* is a book about the global media in the War on Terrorism. This expands its market to include those interested in the media in the post-9/11 world. To date, writers have focused on the coverage before and during the invasion of Iraq. Two prominent books contend that American media negligence made it complicit in drawing America into an ill-conceived war:

- *When the Press Fails: Political Power and the News Media from Iraq to Katrina*, W. Lance Bennett, Regina G. Lawrence, and Steven Livingston (University Of Chicago Press, 2007, 278 pages, \$22.50) contends that the press has lost its independence from the government and this is compromising objective coverage of events.

- *Now They Tell Us: The American Press and Iraq*, Michael Massing (New York Review Books, 2004, 91 pages, \$9.95) argues that the press, by its negligence, was complicit in leading America into the Iraq war.

*Ideas to Die for* differs from these titles, first, in that it focuses on how the media affects public opinion, rather than the quality of media coverage. Second, *Ideas to Die for* examines the way the media influences the Muslim World, rather than the Western world. This book also differs in that the author's investigation does not end with the news media; he also explores ways entertainment media can change "hearts and minds" in the Middle East and beyond. Finally, *Ideas to Die for* is written from Pat's unique perspective as a key player in formulating the media and information strategy for the war in Iraq, a perspective unattainable by a non-military author.

BOOK OUTLINE

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## FORMAT AND LENGTH

*Ideas to Die for* will consist of acknowledgements, three parts (containing twelve chapters), an appendix, endnotes, and a bibliography. The manuscript will also include 5 black-and-white line drawings. The total length of the manuscript will be about 250 pages and 70,000 words.

## CHAPTER SUMMARY

Introduction**Chapter One: The Age of Popular War**

Carl von Clausewitz, nearly two decades after the final defeat of Napoleon, wrote that war was "an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.... The true aim of war," he said, was to render an enemy powerless. This definition was forged in the furnace of the Napoleonic Wars, but it ignores an entire class of warfare. What if the enemy you face is not a sovereign or even a regime, but an entire populace? How do you compel every man, woman, and child in a population to do your will? This is the question the British faced in the American Colonies in the 1770s, the French faced in Spain from 1807-1814, and the French again faced in Algeria and Indochina after World War II. In fact, it is the question America faced in the closing days of World War II, as it approached the Japanese mainland; the only sufficient answer America found in that instance was the atomic bomb.

- What is popular war?
- State war versus popular war
- The imperatives of popular war
- Ideas: the engine of popular war
- The rest of this book...

Part One: The Rights of Man**Chapter 2: The New Roman Empire**

Britain emerged from the Seven Years War as the most powerful nation on earth. Its empire stretched from Canada, the Mississippi, and the Caribbean in the west to the Bengal Coast in the east. Its unchallenged naval superiority gave it near absolute control of the Atlantic and allowed it to span the globe in search of new markets and goods. London, with three-quarters of a million people, was the largest city in Europe and universally acknowledged as the capital of the world. But its size and military power concealed deep, systemic problems that made the British Empire in reality a fragile phenomenon, teetering on the edge of oblivion.

- The French and Indian Wars (the Seven Years' War)
- The road to the intolerable acts
- Rising tensions in the colonies
  - The Boston Massacre
  - The *Gaspée* in flames
  - The Boston Tea Party
  - Lexington and Concord

**Chapter 3: From Enlightenment to *Common Sense***

In an age when the average political pamphlet sold 2,000 copies, Thomas Paine's *Common Sense* was a blockbuster. Between 120,000 and 130,000 copies were printed. It was, by orders of magnitude, the bestselling book in the history of American literature in its day. Hundreds of thousands of people, perhaps one fifth of the total population of the colonies, read *Common Sense*

or had it read to them during the course of the war. George Washington called the book "unanswerable" and noted in letters that it was "working a wonderful change...in the minds of many men." Even fellow revolutionary Sam Adams, who had labored for over a decade for independence before Thomas Paine even arrived in America, was forced to admit in a letter to Paine that *Common Sense* "awakened the public mind, and led the people loudly to call for a declaration of our national independence."

- The Age of Enlightenment
- The ideology of liberty
  - *Common Sense*
  - The Declaration of Independence
- The liberty idea

#### **Chapter 4: "If Their Treason Be Suffered to Take Root..."**

King George III demonstrated his resolve with a display of raw military force that was, in its time, of an unimaginable scale. Nearly 32,000 men in over 400 ships set sail for the rebellious American colonies. The king was sending more men than inhabited the largest city on the American continent (Philadelphia, with a population of 30,000). When the fleet arrived in New York harbor in the summer of 1776, it would be the largest naval force ever assembled in American waters. This invasion was, at the time, the largest amphibious military operation in the history of warfare and, by orders of magnitude, the largest European force ever deployed off the continent.

- The empire strikes back
- The silver lining
  - Crossing the Delaware
  - The French
- One step forward...

- o Slavery
- o The Indians
- o Bloody Ban
- The victory-atrocity cycle
- Ideas vs. bullets

## Part Two: A Return to Darkness

### **Chapter 5: The Long Humiliation**

For the vast majority of Americans, the Global War on Terrorism began on 11 September 2001. The more informed American might hazard that the war began with the bombing of the *USS Cole*, American embassies in Africa, or even Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia. A few observers might even draw a line from the current war to the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983. However, when one views the Global War on Terrorism as a war of ideas, one must see all of these events as the latest in a long chain of retaliations against perpetual humiliation. In the eyes of the Muslim world, in particular the Arab world, Salifist Jihadism is a response to a series of Western affronts that began with Napoleon's defeat of the Mamalukes in Egypt in 1798.

- The Islamic caliphate and the long stagnation
- Strategic shock: Napoleon in Egypt
- Western subjugation and anti-colonialism in the Middle East
- The battle for the Muslim mind

### **Chapter 6: Rejecting Modernity: Salifist Jihadism**

Sayyid Qutb returned from America convinced that a return to strict observance of Islam, Salifism, was not enough. What would change if the spirit was freed but the body remained enslaved? In addition to observing the

individual strictures of the Quran, Qutb insisted that Islam must observe the social and political strictures as well. This was political Salifism: imposing the strictures of the Quran not just on the individual, but on the political structures of the Muslim world. This new movement immediately brought Qutb and his Muslim Brotherhood into open conflict with the secular government of Egypt.

- The birth of political Salifism--the Muslim Brothers.
- The defeat of the great Satan in Afghanistan
- The building blocks of Salifist Jihadism
  - Suicide terror
  - Political Salifism
  - Jihad organization
- Salfist Jihadism as an idea

#### **Chapter 7: The Global War on Terrorism**

"They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the twentieth century," the President told a a joint session of Congress. "By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions--by abandoning every value except the will to power--they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way, to where it ends: in history's unmarked grave of discarded lies." America's course was set. This was not a war of ideas, a struggle for the mind of Islam; this was a war of annihilation. Just as Britain had done over two hundred years earlier, America sent its vast military might across an ocean to liberate the many from the tyranny of a few.

- The response to terrorism in the West
  - Law enforcement and air strikes
  - Global War on Terrorism

- The victory-atrocity cycle
- Smart bombs vs. ideas

### Part Three: The Unfinished Revolution

#### **Chapter 8: Industrialized Suffering**

The greatest atrocity was not that slavery existed. Slavery in the Americas was the spiritual descendent of a practice that had existed for all of human history. It was slave labor that hoisted stones to the top of the Tower of Babel and the Egyptian Pyramids. The toil of slavery fed and clothed the ancient Athenians that gave birth to democracy. Slave power made Rome the most powerful empire on Earth. The greatest evil of Slavery in the seventeenth and eighteenth century was not its existence but its scale. Between 1783 and 1793, under the umbrella of British naval might, slavers from Liverpool alone made 878 round trips from Africa to the West Indies with 303,737 slaves worth £15,186,850. The journey alone killed 40,000.

- The history of slavery
- The West African slave trade
  - The Portugese-Spanish slave trade
  - The French slave trade
  - The British slave trade
- Slavery in the West Indies
- Slavery in America

#### **Chapter 9: A Necessary Evil**

As justifications for slavery collapsed, even slave owners themselves began denouncing slavery. Slavery advocates began to argue that slavery was a burden they had to bear rather than a convenience to aid in their profit. In

response to Harriet Beecher Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, Mary Chestnut, daughter-in-law of a wealthy plantation owner, lamented of her fellow Southern women, "They of the South are doomed to live in Negro villages in inhabitants of which walk through their houses whenever they see fit, dirty, slatternly, idle, ill-smelling by nature.... They have a swarm of blacks about them like children under their care. And they hate slavery as much as Mrs Stowe does."

- Rationalizing subjugation
- In defense of slavery
  - West Indian pro-slavery arguments
  - Southern US pro-slavery arguments
- The slavery idea

#### **Chapter 10: Enlightenment to Abolition**

Modern international relations theorists lament that, in the absence of some dramatic, existential threat, it is very difficult to rally a free nation behind a single security strategy. The anti-slavery movement in Britain is, as much as any other example in history, a picture of how to formulate strategy in a peacetime democracy. The movement worked as hard to build a universal consensus among its own populace as it did to guide the foreign policy of its government. Anti-slavery was first a domestic political struggle, long before it was a national security strategy. The progressive moral weight of the anti-slavery acts of 1807, 1822, and 1833, combined with the gradually unanimous opinion of the British people against slavery, compelled the government to export anti-slavery abroad and enforce it until emancipation was universal.

- Enlightenment and slavery
- Anti-slavery in the early eighteenth century
- Setbacks for the anti-slavery movement

- o The French Revolution
- o Revolution in San Domingue
- Resurgence and victory of anti-slavery
- Ideas vs. ideas

## Conclusion

### **Chapter 11: The Media Battlespace and a War of Ideas**

The media battlespace is the global, interconnected, telecommunications architecture of the modern world. It is the collective result of the Internet, satellite television, and all of the other means that provide worldwide news, entertainment, and communication. It is Fox News. It is Al-Jazeera. It is Reuters. It is John Stewart's The Daily Show. It is every way that human beings are informed about events in their world in the information age. In the twenty-first century, the media battlespace is the battlefield on which a war of ideas takes place.

- The media battlespace
- Salifist Jihadism and the media battlespace
- A war of ideas in the information age

### **Chapter 12: Taming Tradition**

The same law that established the idea of public diplomacy over a half century ago, the Smith-Mundt Act, now prevents the United States from engaging in the war of ideas in the media battlespace. This act established the US Information Agency and the Voice of America in order to allow the US to better influence foreign populaces. But in the act were the seeds of its own undoing. Lawmakers, wary of the propaganda abuses of World War I and II, mandated that public diplomacy products not be distributed to the American

people. This was easily enforced in 1948, when radio broadcast in Europe stayed in Europe and images distributed in China could never reach the United States. However, in an age when cartoons in Denmark can spark riots in Indonesia, it is impossible to prevent *any* government product from reaching the American people.

- Salfist Jihadism and the Muslim World
- The West and the media battlespace
- Taming tradition

## CHAPTER 1

## THE AGE OF POPULAR WAR

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the United States faces a new kind of threat, a threat that defies the overwhelming military might that has made the United States the world's sole remaining superpower. This threat began as an idea, *salifism*, the yearning of a people to return to a mythical "golden age" of Islam. This idea in turn inspired a holy war, a *jihad*, against the West.<sup>1</sup> Salifist jihadism was first the foundation a global terrorist network that launched a wave of terrorist violence culminating in the attacks in New York and Washington DC on 11 September 2001. When the United States responded with overwhelming military force against the heart of this network in Afghanistan, salifist jihadism metastasized into an even more difficult problem, a global movement<sup>2</sup> that initiated an even worse wave of terrorist violence across Europe and the Muslim World.

Only days after the 11 September attacks, in a speech before a joint session of Congress, President George W. Bush declared a "global war on terror."<sup>3</sup> But, no matter how hard it tries, the United States can never kill

its way to victory in this war. There is no government to force to capitulate. Moreover, the population that must be compelled to abandon salifist jihadism is so vast and spread over such a large area that the task is beyond both the United States' capacity and its will. In short, this threat defies war as a solution. The US needs an alternative way to persuade the Muslim World to reject the salifist jihadism idea.

It turns out that the nature of the threat the United States now faces isn't actually that new. A little over two hundred years ago, another population embraced a violent, radical idea and formed a movement that challenged the might of the world's greatest empire. That empire responded with the largest overseas military campaign every mounted. Yet, the more violence the British inflicted, the more the people of its thirteen American colonies flocked to the independence idea. Not only were the British defeated, but the spirit of liberty unleashed in the American Revolution followed their army back to Europe, ignited the French Revolution, and finally transformed Great Britain itself.

This example doesn't provide much hope that the United States will find a way to defeat salifist jihadism. Luckily, however, Great Britain also provides an example of a successful campaign to defeat an insidious, international idea. At the same time Great Britain was waging a war to extinguish liberty in America, the embers of a different liberation idea were smoldering in Great Britain itself. These embers ignited into a global anti-slavery movement that ultimately succeeded in defeating the slavery idea and ending slavery, a practice that had persisted since before the beginning of human history. And they did it without firing a shot.

How could a simple idea hold at bay the most powerful military on Earth, today or two hundred years ago? How could a movement defeat a pervasive, mainstream idea with no military force at all? The answers to these questions lie in a fundamental change in the nature of society and

warfare that began to take shape three centuries ago, in the Age of Enlightenment.

#### THE AGE OF ENLIGHTENMENT

It was in this new age that philosophers across Europe, applying the tools of scientific inquiry to questions of human society, began re-envisioning the world. The conversations these philosophers were having were not esoteric debates. In the Netherlands and Great Britain, democracy slowly began to reemerge from its millennia-long slumber. In America, the founding fathers asserted John Locke's "natural rights" to life, liberty, and property when they drafted the Declaration of Independence.<sup>4</sup> The Enlightenment was reshaping the role of the individual in society and the relationship between the ruler and the ruled and slowly, inexorably eroding the old institutions on which Western societies were based.

No such reordering, however, was taking place in France. The growing middle class in France still struggled under the yoke of an absolute monarch and an arbitrary nobility. They had little personal freedom and even less political power. As their ranks swelled, pressure began to build for change, but the French monarch resisted. The more the king resisted, the more explosive public sentiment became. At the eleventh hour, King Louis XVI tried to enact minor reforms, but matters rapidly spiraled out of his control. First, a series of riots in Paris culminated in the storming of the Bastille in July 1789. Next, the Marquis de Lafayette, with help from Thomas Jefferson, drafted the French Declaration of the Rights of Man. Then the French began beheading their nobles.<sup>5</sup> The French Revolution had begun.

If, as the French people were asserting, leaders ruled by consent of the governed rather than by divine right, then the days of absolute monarchy were numbered. The execution of King Louis XVI finally moved the stunned kings Europe to action. They formed a succession of coalitions to crush the

French Revolution and restore the French monarchy. Yet, the more violently the great powers of Europe assailed France, the harder the French people resisted. The very nature of war had changed. For the first time, war was not simply a matter between princes, waged rationally, coldly. France had mobilized its entire population and was fielding armies on a scale that would have been unimaginable in any other age. Because they were volunteers, fighting for their rights, the French army could forage for supplies and was no longer limited by the supply bases or draconian discipline that had previously limited the size of Western armies. Because it was a war of national survival, France could mobilize its entire population and equip its vast army with cannons and muskets far faster than other European powers. When a brilliant new leader, Napoleon Bonaparte, finally harnessed this power, France subjugated Europe and ended the war in a series of stunning victories.<sup>6</sup> The age of popular war had arrived.

How had an army of amateurs, led by a man who had been only an artillery captain a few years earlier, trounced the combined might of Europe? Especially shocking was the culminating campaign that finally silenced the great powers of Europe, the defeat of the Prussian army. This highly professional military, led so ably by Frederick the Great only a century before, had been the envy of Europe. Napoleon had humiliated them in a lightning campaign that lasted less than three weeks. In 1806 Napoleon's 160,000 defeated the quarter-million-man Prussian army, killing 25,000 and leading another 150,000 back to France in chains.<sup>7</sup>

Napoleon's dominance of Europe was short-lived, a victim of his own ambition and the very changes he had wrought on his neighbors. Grueling insurgencies in Naples and Spain prevented Napoleon from consolidating his gains. When Russia defied Napoleon's trade embargo--his "continental system"--France gathered a massive coalition army and marched on Moscow. Napoleon was successful in taking the capital, yet victory eluded him. With

winter and hunger pressing in, Napoleon began the long, humiliating march back to France, hounded at every step by the Russians. Of the 600,000 who marched into Russia in June 1812, only 93,000 returned in December.<sup>8</sup> With the French Army bled white by the Spanish "ulcer" and the Russian debacle, Napoleon's enemies finally saw their opportunity to strike. In a series of battles culminating at Waterloo in 1815, the armies of Europe, reshaped in the Napoleonic image, forced Napoleon first to briefly abdicate and then finally to abandon his throne.<sup>9</sup>

#### ON POPULAR WAR

Since Napoleon's first dramatic victories, military theorists had all been asking the same question: How did he do it? Writers like Swiss émigré to France, Antoine Henri Jomini, immediately turned to the tools of the Enlightenment, rationalism and scientific method, to find answers. Even Napoleon himself wrote maxims for the successful prosecution of warfare. But the most fascinating, enigmatic work of military theory to come out of Napoleonic Wars was unquestionably *On War*, written by Carl von Clausewitz.

Carl von Clausewitz was an eyewitness to the dawn of popular war. As a young aide-de-camp to German Prince August, Carl von Clausewitz was one of the 150,000 Prussian prisoners led back to France in 1806 after the battle of Jena-Auerstädt. He spent a year in captivity in France before returning to Prussia. After a few years helping to modernize the Prussian army, the humiliation of his country's alliance with France became more than he could bear. Following many other Prussian officers, he travelled to Russia to join the czar as he prepared to challenge Napoleon. Clausewitz served in the Russian army, fighting the French during Napoleon's ill-fated Russian campaign. After Napoleon's grueling retreat from Russia, Clausewitz rejoined the Prussian army for the Waterloo campaign that finally ended Napoleon's rule.<sup>10</sup>

After the war, Clausewitz was promoted to major general and made director of the *Kriegsakademie* in Prussia. From here, he too began to record his reflections on the revolution in warfare he had witnessed in his lifetime. At first, he wrote histories: the battles of Fredrick the Great, the French Revolution, and the Napoleonic wars. However, as he wrote these histories, he also labored on a much more ambitious work.<sup>11</sup>

*Vom Krieg (On War)* was Clausewitz' attempt to understand war itself. Like other military theorists of the age, Clausewitz was asking why Napoleon had been so successful. However, unlike any of his contemporaries, Clausewitz was also asking why Napoleon was unsuccessful. Why had Napoleon failed in Russia? He assembled the largest Army in the history of Europe and captured his enemy's capital, yet Napoleon couldn't force Russia to capitulate. Why did France have so much difficulty with the insurgencies in Spain and Naples? In both countries, the sovereigns were vanquished, yet the people continued to resist.

Clausewitz began *On War* with a simple question: what is war? The question might seem trite. It did to Jomini. In his work, *The Art of War*, Jomini didn't even bother to ask the question, let alone answer it. But Clausewitz didn't want to know how to fight a war; he wanted to *understand* war, especially the phenomenon of popular war that had emerged in his lifetime. War, Clausewitz wrote, must be understood as "an object suspended between three magnets," a "paradoxical trinity." Wars had always been governed by reason, "the business of government." Likewise, war had always been "the realm of probability and chance," the realm of "the commander and the army." Now, however, in this new age, war was also governed by passion, which was "inherent in the people."<sup>12</sup> For the first time, the people, mobilized by ideas, exerted as powerful an influence on wars as did the governments that started them or the generals that waged them.

But Clausewitz did not stop here. Most are familiar with Clausewitz' oft-quoted maxim, "War is merely the continuation of [politics] by other means." However, this is only a corollary to a more profound point. What is war? Clausewitz answered, "War is...an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will."<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, in the age of popular war where--as in Russia, Spain, and Naples--the people could continue the war even after their governments were driven out or destroyed, the "enemy" was not just the opposing sovereign. The enemy was also the people of the enemy nation. Thus, in this new age, war was the violent prosecution of both traditional politics between sovereigns and mass politics between nations.

In his quest to understand war, Clausewitz had inadvertently discovered that the dawn of popular war was, in fact, the dawn of mass politics. For the first time, the people had real political power and ideas were the source of that power. People mobilized by powerful ideas were an unstoppable political force. In the context of war, where governments and generals had once dominated, the introduction of the people, empowered by ideas, was a recipe for tragedy.

The terrible truth of Clausewitz' insight became more evident with each war that followed. Each time the great powers clashed, the numbers and carnage became evermore vast. The Crimean War, the American Civil War, the Wars of German Unification, World War I, and World War II--each war was more cataclysmic than the last. Populations animated by ideas--nationalism, liberty, civil justice, or racial supremacy--were perpetrating violence on an unspeakable scale. By the middle of the twentieth century, when Germany invaded Russia, the Russians mobilized an unbelievable 36 million people.<sup>14</sup> Even in the Pacific, where the numbers were relatively small, 2.2 million American servicemen, mobilized by the idea of defending democracy, joined 5.6 million allies in a clash against six million Japanese, mobilized by the idea of militant racial supremacy. The Allies killed 2.5 million Japanese

combatants and three-quarters of a million more civilians.<sup>15</sup> Yet, even after this unbelievable carnage, it still took two atomic bombs and the death of over 100,000 more Japanese to compel them to surrender.<sup>16</sup> The level of violence required to compel a population to abandon an idea had become incomprehensible.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the United States is engaged in a "War on Terrorism" to defeat salifist jihadism. If this is a war, in the sense Carl von Clausewitz understood it nearly two hundred years ago, then it is "an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will."<sup>17</sup> But who is the enemy? What country and what populace must the United States compel in the War on Terrorism? According to a recent Gallup poll, seven percent of the world's 1.3 billion Muslims, or 91 million people, saw the attacks of 11 September 2001 as "completely" justified.<sup>18</sup> By way of comparison, the population of World War II Japan was only 70 million people.<sup>19</sup> It is doubtful the United States could muster anything approaching the eight million men the Allies required to defeat Japan in World War II, let alone summon the will to use nuclear weapons. Even if the nation could muster the men or the will, whom would it attack? The Arab World alone comprises 25 countries across Africa and Asia and over 200 million Muslims; this is less than one fifth of the whole Muslim World, with representation in nearly every country on Earth, including the countries of the West.<sup>20</sup> According to a Pew Research Center Poll, between seven and 15 percent of British Muslims (as many as 240,000) and as many as seven percent of American Muslims (about 80,000) think that either the 11 September attacks or suicide bombing in general is justified.<sup>21</sup> Whom should the United States attack?

The United States cannot hope to defeat salifist jihadism through violence. What the United States needs is a different way to compel a population. Luckily, such a way already exists. Communist revolutionary, Chairman Mao Tse-Tung once wrote a very useful corollary to Clausewitz most

famous maxim on the nature of war. He wrote, "Politics is war without [violence]." <sup>22</sup> In other words, if one is engaged in compelling a population without violence, one is not engaged in war, but rather mass politics. But how does one nation wage mass politics against another? For that matter, how does one nation wage mass politics against many?

This book is an attempt to answer this question. The book begins by trying to understand the problem: Why is violence such an inefficient tool for compelling a population? First, in Part One, this book studies the example of the American Revolution. The British waged a vast military campaign in order to defeat the independence idea in the American colonies. Why did they fail? What can one learn from this failure? Part Two of this book will take a fresh look at the War on Terrorism. Are we on the same path that led the British to failure two centuries ago? Is it already too late to change course?

Ultimately, however, the purpose of this book is not just to understand the problem, but also to find a solution. The rest of this book is dedicated to developing a method for the United States to wage mass politics in the Muslim World to defeat the salifist jihadism idea. Part Three begins by taking a closer look at the anti-slavery movement in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. How did this movement, in a single century, defeat the slavery idea, a pervasive, international idea that buttressed a practice that had existed since the beginning of human society? Finally, using the insights from all of these examples, this book will conclude by charting a new course for the United States in its struggle to defeat salifist jihadiism.

#### WHAT IS AN IDEA?

This is a book about ideas: how they are constructed, how they spread, and how they cause social change. Before continuing, it is useful to have a

framework, a template, for describing the ideas that this book will discuss. The following model is a synthesis of several academic fields, including philosophy, international relations, and military theory. For a more complete description of this model and how it was developed, see the Appendix.

Figure 1 shows the model this book will use to describe an idea and its context. In this model, a *population* is presented with a *problem*. The nature of this problem may be an acute political, social, economic, or artificial contradiction in a society.<sup>23</sup> The severity of the problem creates tension and drives the population to seek *resolution* of the problem.




Figure 1:  
An idea and its context

In each case examined in this book, the population cannot move directly to a resolution (using a *potential solution*) because of an *obstacle*--cultural, legal, or material. Thus, an *idea* is either generated or adopted by a *movement* to overcome the obstacle. For the idea to be viable, it must have broad based appeal. Additionally, the movement must be able to uniquely identify itself with the idea. Finally, the idea must be durable enough to carry the movement to resolution of the problem.<sup>24</sup>

An idea consists of *principles*, supported by *arguments*. Arguments can take one of three forms: backing-warrant (derived from meta-principles that are nearly universally accepted by the population), ground-reason (based on observable data and evidence), or counterargument-rebuttal (answers to possible objections).<sup>25</sup>

The principles of the idea have several *consequences* from which the population and/or movement derive *power* to resolve the problem. The power delivered by an idea can enable (permit a behavior), compel (force a behavior, even in the absence of members of the movement), or imbue (impart power to holders of the idea). Two other products of an idea threaten to destroy it. First, the principles of an idea will also generate *unintended consequences*, which may undermine the idea. Second, the intended consequences of the principle might lead to *inherent contradictions* in the idea that can weaken or destroy it.

Finally, in each of the situations this book will examine, there is also an *opponent*, working against the movement, trying to stop it from resolving the problem in the manner the idea allows. This is not to say that the opponent necessarily wants to prevent the population from resolving the problem (though this may be the case). For the purposes of this model, an opponent is only necessarily opposed to the idea itself.

This model exposes a number of vulnerabilities that an opponent can exploit in order to undermine an idea.

1. The obstacle. If the scale of the obstacle increases, the idea must better empower the movement and/or the population to overcome it.

2. The movement. If all of the members of a movement are eliminated, the idea might die because there is no one left to champion it.

3. Counter-ideas. An opponent can present the population with an alternate idea which also resolves the problem, potentially starving the movement and the original idea of support.

4. Arguments. Arguments can be attacked either by disproving the validity of the idea's arguments or by counterargument. An idea founded more in backing-warrant arguments (meta-principles) is more vulnerable than one founded more in ground-reason arguments (evidence).

5. Unintended consequences. These can potentially undermine support for the idea among the population. They cannot be predicted or avoided, only mitigated by the movement.

6. Inherent contradictions. These threaten an idea because they prevent people from supporting the idea or joining the movement.

7. Mode of transmission (over-transmission). With each transmission of an idea, new unintended consequences develop and new inherent contradictions arise. Creating doctrine or dogma mitigates this, but also keeps the idea from evolving.

8. Mode of transmission (blocked transmission). Opponents of an idea can try to stop its spread.

To summarize, for the purposes of this book, an idea is defined as:

Principles and supporting arguments, the consequences of which empower a movement and/or a population to overcome some obstacle (philosophical, legal, or material) and resolve a problem.

"Defeating an idea," then, means preventing a population from using an idea to resolve a problem. It bears repeating that an opponent might only be concerned with preventing the population from embracing the idea. The opponent could well be ambivalent or even sympathetic to the population and its problem.

The next chapter begins Part One of this book. This model for an idea will be applied to the independence idea, the American Revolution, and the British response. What were the principles and arguments for independence? What were the consequences of those principles and how did they empower the colonists and their fledgling continental institutions? Did the principles of independence lead to any inherent contradictions or unintended consequences? How did Britain react to this movement; what vulnerabilities did they exploit? And why, ultimately, did the British fail to defeat the independence idea? Part One will seek answers to these questions.

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<sup>1</sup> Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002), 219-221.

<sup>2</sup> Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University, 2006), 280-289.

<sup>3</sup> Tony Karon, "Bush Claims the Mantle of World Leader," *Time*, 21 September 2001, <http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,175885,00.html>, accessed 16 August 2009.

<sup>4</sup> Alfred W. Blumrosen and Ruth G. Blumrosen, *Slave Nation: How Slavery United the Colonies & Sparked the American Revolution*, (Naperville, IL: Sourcebooks, 2005), 125-127.

<sup>5</sup> Jay Wink, *The Great Upheaval: America and the Birth of the Modern World, 1788-1800* (New York: Harper, 2007), 108-148, 227-273; Philip G. Dwyer

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and Peter McPhee, eds., *The French Revolution and Napoleon: A Sourcebook* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 18-20.

<sup>6</sup> Robert M. Epstein, *Napoleon's Last Victory and the Emergence of Modern War* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 1-32.

<sup>7</sup> Robert Asprey, *The Reign of Napoleon Bonaparte* (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 20-33.

<sup>8</sup> John A. Lynn, "Nations in Arms, 1763-1815," in *The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare: The Triumph of the West*, Geoffrey Parker, ed. (New York: Cambridge University, 1995), 204.

<sup>9</sup> Robert Asprey, *The Reign of Napoleon Bonaparte* (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 291-401.

<sup>10</sup> Peter Paret, "The Genesis of *On War*," in *On War*, Carl von Clausewitz, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1976), 3-25.

<sup>11</sup> Peter Paret, "The Genesis of *On War*," in *On War*, Carl von Clausewitz, eds. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1976), 75.

<sup>12</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, eds. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, *On War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1976), 89.

<sup>13</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, eds. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, *On War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1976), 75, 87.

<sup>14</sup> Matthew Cooper, *The German Army*, (Chelsea, MI: Scarborough, 1978), 1984.

<sup>15</sup> Werner Gruhl, *Imperial Japan's World War Two, 1931-1945* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2007), 62.

<sup>16</sup> Williamson A. Murray, "The World at War, 1941-1945," in *The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare: The Triumph of the West*, Geoffrey Parker, ed. (New York: Cambridge University, 1995), 339.

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<sup>17</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, eds. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, *On War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1976), 75.

<sup>18</sup> Joel C. Rosenberg, *Inside the Revolution: How the Followers of Jihad, Jefferson & Jesus Are Battling to Dominate the Middle East and Transform the World* (Carol Stream, IL: Tyndale, 2009), 143-152.

<sup>19</sup> David Horner, *The Second World War (I): The Pacific* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 20.

<sup>20</sup> Sayyed Hussein Nasr, "Islam," in *Our Religions*, ed. Arvind Sharma (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), 435-440.

<sup>21</sup> Joel C. Rosenberg, *Inside the Revolution: How the Followers of Jihad, Jefferson & Jesus Are Battling to Dominate the Middle East and Transform the World* (Carol Stream, IL: Tyndale, 2009), 143-152.

<sup>22</sup> Mao Tse-Tung, "War and Politics," in *The Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, Volume II* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1965), 153.

<sup>23</sup> David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1968), 19-25.

<sup>24</sup> David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1968), 19-25.

<sup>25</sup> Charles W. Kneupper, "Teaching Argument: An Introduction to the Toulmin Model," *College Composition and Communication* Vol. 29, No. 3 (October 1978): 237-241.