

FIGHTING IN THE MEDIA BATTLESPACE

by

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major Pat Proctor spent a year doing research on the media, the enemy in Iraq, and public affairs-information operations integration while participating in the Graduate Degree Program at the United States Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He also spent a year assigned to the Center for Army Lessons Learned, attached on special assignment to the Information Operations Cell, Strategic Effects, Multi-National Force-Iraq in Baghdad. While serving as the information operations plans officer, his concurrent mission was to continue his research in this field. Major Proctor is currently attending the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

We must learn to employ aggressive IO. We cannot leave this domain for the enemy; we must fight him on this battlefield and defeat him there just as we've proven we can on conventional battlefields.

LTG Thomas F. Metz
Former Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq¹

The past half century of warfare has seen a military revolution, the telecommunications revolution. This has fundamentally reshaped warfare and society in dramatic ways. The US military embraced this revolution and successfully reshaped itself by embarking on a revolution in military affairs, becoming networked and computerized. By doing so, it temporarily gained an asymmetric advantage over every other military in the world. But it has been caught completely unprepared for a second revolution in military affairs, the media-enabled insurgency, and now finds itself at an asymmetric disadvantage to its enemy in Iraq.

While the US military created its revolution in military affairs primarily by developing new technology, the enemy in Iraq has created a revolution by using existing technology and crafting new tactics and doctrine for exploiting it. The US military has tried in vain to combat this new revolution with a tool designed for the last--information operations. To succeed in Iraq, the US military must visualize warfare in a different way and master the new media battlespace.

THE RESPONSE TO REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE

The telecommunications revolution is a military revolution. It has "recast society and state as well as military organizations."² Information technology has had a huge economic impact, steadily increasing the productivity of the industrialized world for the past quarter century. This revolution has also increased interconnectivity. The world is a

smaller place. Since World War II, the world has gone from AM radio and the telephone to global multi-media corporations and the Internet. Telecommunications has created a “world community” and given a global voice to those in the most remote regions of the world. Totalitarian regimes struggle to keep information out, while media outlets try to spread their products to every corner of the globe.

The telecommunications revolution has had a major impact on military organizations. The most recent expression of this change is the concept of “network-centric warfare.” The Department of Defense’s Office of Force Transformation describes the concept:

Network-centric warfare is an emerging theory of war in the Information Age. It is also a concept that, at the highest level, constitutes the military’s response to the Information Age. The term network-centric warfare broadly describes the combination of strategies, emerging tactics, techniques, and procedures, and organizations that a fully or even a partially networked force can employ to create a decisive warfighting advantage.³

The “governing principles” of this new “theory of war” are enumerated below:

- Fight first for *information superiority*
- Access to information: *shared awareness*
- *Speed of command* and decision making
- *Self-synchronization*
- *Dispersed forces*: non-contiguous operations
- *Demassification*
- *Deep sensor reach*
- *Alter initial conditions* at higher rates of change
- *Compressed operations* and levels of war⁴

In essence, network-centric warfare is doing more with less, substituting increased situational awareness, “information superiority,” for massed fire power.

One could argue that, rather than a revolution in military affairs (RMA), this is simply an increased realization of progress that began with the advent of combined arms warfare. In other words, this is nothing new, but rather doing old things better. The

advocate of network-centric warfare would, in response, point to the initial invasion of Iraq in Operation Iraqi Freedom. A coalition of around 150,000 subdued an Army at least three times its size in only twenty-one days with only three percent of its opponent's casualties.⁵ The numbers in the first Gulf War were nearly as dramatic. This is revolutionary, at least in degree. Small, agile, lethal forces, interconnected and synchronized over vast distances, wreak havoc on more conventional, Soviet-style formations that lack telecommunications capability.




Figure 1: The information environment in joint doctrine
Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Headquarters Department of Defense, JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC, 17 September 2006), II-23.

While this RMA began primarily as a technological revolution, it also developed a strong, doctrinal component. As the US military became ever more digitized, it began to realize the growing importance of information in maintaining an asymmetric advantage in situational awareness and agility. Militarizing the emerging concept of “cyberspace” in the mid-1990s, the military began to describe the battlefield as two “environments,” the physical and the information environment. As this concept emerged, doctrine-writers acknowledged that the whole information environment was not within the capability of the military to influence. There was a “military information environment” consisting of friendly and enemy information systems. However, it existed inside a larger “global information environment,” which contained all means that “disseminate information to national and international audiences” (including the media) and was “outside the control of the military.”⁶

Information operations, as it was originally conceived, was operations in the military information environment and happened through and across information systems. This information environment stretched from continental United States (CONUS) military bases to the theater of operations. The military force had to achieve “information dominance” in the information environment to succeed. To do this, information operations (IO) was created to keep the US military’s information safe and disrupt or exploit the enemy’s information.⁷ The five “core elements” of IO, computer network operations (CNO), operational security (OPSEC), military deception (MILDEC), psychological operations (PSYOP), and electronic warfare (EW), were the tools the US military used to fight “information warfare.” Civil affairs (called civil military operations or CMO in joint doctrine) and public affairs were relegated to “related activities,”⁸ since

they did not occur in the military information environment, but in the physical theater of operations and in the media, respectively.

Information operations gave the US military the tools to reliably achieve information dominance on the conventional battlefield. Being networked, computerized, and able to “acquire, use, manage, protect, exploit, and deny” information in the military information environment⁹ gave the US military an asymmetric advantage over any conventional military force in the world.

THE LIMITS OF A REVOLUTION

Enter the Global War on Terror. Within two short years, the US military was fighting two wars on two different battlefields, with no conventional opponent to be found. Both Afghanistan and Iraq had quickly transitioned from high-intensity conflict to grueling counterinsurgency. The same IO doctrine that had facilitated lightning victories in two Persian Gulf wars now seemed insufficient to fight a war occurring largely in the media.

From the beginning, in the Summer of 2003, the insurgency in Iraq had no hope of defeating the US military on the battlefield. The casualties the enemy inflicts on the US military in Iraq, while tragic, are tactically insignificant. But the enemy’s objective is not to defeat the US military by attrition. The enemy’s objective is to use small, tactical attacks, amplified through the megaphone of the media, to erode US public support for the war. Henry Kissinger famously observed, at the height of the Vietnam War, that “the guerrilla wins if he doesn’t lose.”¹⁰ This is only half of the story in Iraq. It is true that the enemy must maintain sufficient support in his own population to survive and avoid obliteration by the US military. But, to win (to force the withdrawal of the US military

from Iraq) the enemy must also maintain the steady drumbeat of casualties and car bombs in the press that erode the American public's support for the war.

For the US military to win in Iraq, it needs both the ability to influence the populace in the operational area and the ability to "defend" American public opinion from enemy influence. The US military has looked to IO and the "related activity" of public affairs, to provide these capabilities. Consider this from the US Army's newly minted FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*.

Information operations must be aggressively employed to accomplish the following:

- Favorably influence perceptions of [host nation] legitimacy and capabilities.
- Obtain local, regional, and international support for [counterinsurgency] operations.
- Publicize insurgent violence.
- Discredit insurgent propaganda and provide a more compelling alternative to the insurgent ideology and narrative.¹¹

IO, from its inception, was designed to protect the US military's information and attack that of an enemy military. This new doctrine now asks it to adapt to influence "local, regional, and international" populations. OPSEC and EW have no influence component at all. They are focused on protecting information and attacking or monitoring communications systems, respectively. MILDEC is designed to influence enemy *military* decision-makers, not civilian populations. CNO has components that could be used to conduct "influence operations" on the Internet. However, because of First Amendment concerns and the world-wide nature of the Internet, gaining permissions to use CNO in this way requires approval at the highest levels of government. This renders CNO largely ineffective and much less agile than the average

Internet-savvy insurgent. PSYOP is the only capability in the IO arsenal that has the capability to influence populations.

But that immediately creates problems for integrating IO with the “related activity” of public affairs, the traditional military tool for speaking to populations through the media. There is a significant body of laws in the United States that prevent PSYOP from being conducted on the populace of the United States.¹² Public affairs is the only military discipline which has as a target audience the American public, but its purpose is to inform rather than to influence.¹³ The current generation of joint public affairs doctrine, JP 3-61, *Public Affairs*, states the problem as plainly as it can be said: “propaganda has no place in DOD public affairs programs.”¹⁴ To achieve this goal, significant doctrinal barriers have been erected between PSYOP, a core element of IO, and PA. LTG Metz articulated this problem, “We are not consistently achieving synergy and mass in our strategic communications (consisting of IO, public affairs, public diplomacy, and military diplomacy) from the strategic to the tactical level.” The problem, as he sees it, is a doctrinal “firewall” between IO and PA.¹⁵

The US military’s influencing tool (PSYOP) cannot be used with the US populace, while the military’s tool for communicating with the American populace (PA) is intended to inform rather than influence. The US military consequently has no way to influence the American populace. This is a healthy and positive aspect of any military in service of a democratic nation. But it is not surprising that, as a result, the US military has been utterly powerless to prevent the enemy from eroding the will of the American public to fight the war. In a Pew Poll conducted the day after the statue of Saddam Hussein fell (10 April 2003), 74 percent of those polled felt it was the “right decision” to

use military force in Iraq, while only 19 percent said it was the “wrong decision.” Nearly four years later, in February of 2007, only 40 percent said it was the “right decision” while 54 percent, said it was the “wrong decision.”¹⁶

Why? After all, the US military hasn’t lost any battles and its casualties, while tragic, pale when compared to losses in other wars. American public opinion has plummeted because the enemy is able to attack it with impunity. This revolutionary capability has left the US military at an asymmetric *disadvantage* to the enemy in Iraq in the battle to maintain the will of the American people to prosecute the war (a battle in which the military has not yet decided it should even be fighting).

THE MEDIA-ENABLED INSURGENCY: AN ENEMY RMA

Until World War I, battles were fought in two dimensions. Combat happened on the surface of the earth and the surface of the ocean. World War I brought the revolution in military affairs of unrestricted submarine warfare, which opened a third dimension in naval operations. The war also introduced indirect fire and aerial observation, which opened a third dimension in ground warfare. During the interwar period and through World War II, the scope of combat in this third dimension expanded to include strategic bombing and aerial combat over land and carrier-based aviation over sea.¹⁷

After the advent of the telecommunications revolution, the precursors of network-centric warfare introduced yet another dimension to warfare, the information environment, in which operations occurred to establish information dominance. But now, with this new enemy revolution in military affairs, the media-enabled insurgency, a fifth dimension, a media dimension has emerged. The US military tries in vain to use its old

tools, meant for the information environment, to fight in this new dimension. Currently, the enemy has complete freedom of action in the media--“media superiority.”

The modern battlefield has become so complex that the dimensional construct is no longer adequate to describe it. The human mind, after all, is designed to perceive in only three dimensions. The concept of interconnected battlespaces offers a better construct to understand these new degrees of freedom.

INTERCONNECTED BATTLESPACES




Figure 2: The interconnected battlespaces

Figure 2 shows three interconnected battlespaces: the physical, information, and media battlespace.

The Physical Battlespace

The physical battlespace starts at the boundaries of the area of responsibility and converges inward on the operational area. It is the “real world” where opposing forces engage in combat. It is also the battlespace in which the populace in the operational area lives. Regional bureaus and reporters are the physical projection of “the media” in the physical battlespace. Their products (“coverage” in Figure 2) leave the physical battlespace and enter the media battlespace. Network and communications architecture, radio equipment, tactical operation centers (TOCs), organizational leaders, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets are the physical manifestation of information systems in the physical battlespace. Collectively, they carry data about the physical battlespace (“intelligence” in Figure 2) into the information battlespace.

The Information Battlespace

The information battlespace is the “information environment” described earlier, in the review of IO doctrine. It is the “ether” in which data about the physical battlespace gathers and is analyzed. Organizational leaders operate in the information battlespace, consuming data about the physical battlespace, making decisions, and generating directions communicated to their forces in the physical battlespace (“C2” in Figure 2). Senior leaders in the information battlespace communicate to their constituent populations and the constituent populations of their enemy by generating themes and messages communicated in press conferences and press releases to the media (“themes and messages” in Figure 2). Opposing leaders compete for information dominance via IO as it was originally conceived, in this battlespace.

The Media Battlespace

Figure 3 shows the interaction between the physical battlespace, the media battlespace, and friendly and enemy constituencies.




Figure 3: Interaction between the media and physical battlespace

The media battlespace is the global, interconnected, telecommunications architecture of the modern world. It is the collective result of the Internet, satellite television, and all of the other means that provide world-wide news, entertainment, and communication. It is Fox News. It is Al-Jazeera. It is the Associated Press. It is John Stewart's *The Daily Show*. It is the Website, *The Onion*. It is every way that human

beings are informed about events in their world in the information age. The media battlespace is occupied, virtually, by everyone that is “plugged in” to it. Individual members of the friendly and enemy force are in the media battlespace. The population in the physical battlespace also exists in the media battlespace. And the constituent populations of each force (people outside the physical battlespace who provide, moral, monetary, and logistical support to each force) are also present in the media battlespace. Friendly and enemy forces and their constituent populations struggle against each other in the media battlespace. This conflict is called “media warfare.”

Information reported in the media battlespace by media outlets (news networks, broadcast news, etc.) leaves the media battlespace and enters the information battlespace (“strategic intelligence” in Figure 2). Legitimacy and moral support is generated by friendly and enemy constituencies and is directed at friendly and enemy forces in the physical battlespace (“support” in Figure 2). Actual support, in the form of money, logistics, and personnel moves from the friendly and enemy constituency to the friendly and enemy force physically (entering the physical battlespace from areas of the world outside the battlespace--“support” in Figure 3). However, the level of support each force receives from its constituency is directly proportional to the opinion of each constituency about the activities of its representative force. This is the purpose of media warfare, to erode the public opinion of the constituency for the actions of its representative force in order to reduce the support the force receives.

The mechanism by which this loss of support damages a force is very much dependent on the nature of the force. For Western militaries like the US military, lowered support means reduced numbers of soldiers in combat, less money to reconstruct

and support the host nation, and, eventually, if support becomes low enough, removal from the physical battlespace. For an insurgent force like the enemy in Iraq, reduced support means reduced money to spend conducting attacks, reduced numbers of foreign fighters (*jihadis*) joining their cause, and less support in weaponry from foreign governments. If support for the insurgency drops low enough and support is low enough among the population in the physical battlespace, the insurgency will be defeated because it lacks the means to continue the war and the means to hide in the populace (“like a fish in water,” as Mao Tse-Tung put it¹⁸). Thus, insurgency is less vulnerable to damage from media war because, to defeat it, you must influence both the insurgent’s constituency in the media battlespace and the populace in the physical battlespace.

Four characteristics of the media battlespace have direct military implications: its egalitarianism, its tribalism, its seamlessness, and its anarchy.

Egalitarianism

In the media battlespace, all voices are equal. The price of admission to the media battlespace is the cost of a satellite dish, a cable connection, or access to the Internet. Once a person pays that entrance fee, his voice is equal to that of everyone else in the media battlespace. Voices gain “media superiority” by their appeal. The media battlespace is the ultimate expression of confirmation bias. Those in this battlespace want to be challenged, but only within the limits of their preconceived notions.

To effectively influence within the media battlespace, a military force must craft its message to appeal to the target audience. People in the media battlespace will “vote with their remotes,” tuning out messages that diverge too greatly from their current

views. An effective message proceeds from the target's preconceived notions and moves (influences) the target's perceptions gradually in the desired direction.

Tribalism

Groups congregate in the media battlespace based on their preconceived notions. Some of those notions are a result of culture. But others are a result of circumstance, education, interest, experience, or any number of other factors. These "tribes" can also be created spontaneously by a sudden, popular idea. Tribes gather around certain television programs, satellite networks, or Websites catering to their common interests or ideas. Each tribe in the media battlespace is repeatedly segmented and fractured into tiny sub-tribes. This fragmentation sometimes renders groups so small they occupy only tiny corners of the media battlespace. Additionally a single person can belong to multiple tribes. The resultant structure is so complex and amorphous that it finally becomes easier to find the ideas in the media battlespace than it does to find the individuals that hold them.

To effectively influence within the media battlespace, a military force must identify the target audience's tribes, and go to the places where those tribes congregate. The only feasible tactic is to identify targeted ideas in the media battlespace and try to influence individuals that hold them.

Seamlessness

The media battlespace has no borders. As hard as dictatorial regimes try to keep the world out of their countries, they cannot participate in the world and insulate their people from the media. Only completely "unplugging" from the world (as is the case in North Korea) can isolate a populace from the media battlespace. The closest thing to a

boundary in the media battlespace is language. English is omnipresent, but messages tend to “pool” (e.g., not leave the language in which originally delivered) when transmitted in other languages. However, translation and transmission of ideas between languages does occur, often facilitated by combatants in the media battlespace trying to discredit their opponent with his own words.

Messages that resonate well with one group may offend others. A military force waging war in the media battlespace should always assume that any action it takes will be seen by everyone, not just the target audience.

Anarchy

Anarchy is not chaos. Anarchy is the absence of hierarchy, the absence of a central ruling authority. The media battlespace is anarchic. Although there are rules and laws within the media battlespace, there is no universal ruling authority. In China, Internet service providers block certain Websites and report navigations to them to the government.¹⁹ The United States regulates the political balance of campaign coverage on television.²⁰ Al-Jazeera must “tread lightly” in criticizing Arab regimes, lest it create political problems for itself in its home country of Qatar.²¹ These rules govern portions of the media battlespace, but there is no law that governs the *entire* media battlespace.

A military force should understand it is impossible to exert meaningful control over the media battlespace. Currently, no military force has the capability to assert “media dominance.” A force can only hope to achieve “media superiority” over an adversary by more effectively persuading target audiences in the media battlespace.

SO WHAT?

Why is it so important to achieve “media superiority” in the media battlespace? The answer is simple: unless a person is on the battlefield, all he knows about the war is what he sees in the media. People form opinions about policy matters based on their perceptions. The only way most Americans can form an opinion on the war in Iraq is to consume media products, analyze the information, and decide. Collectively these decisions form public opinion about the war in Iraq and impact how much support the US military receives to prosecute the war. If public support collapses completely, the US military will be forced to withdraw from Iraq.

Isn't this a matter of national strategy? Why is this an operational-level problem? Simply put, it is an operational-level problem because the enemy is conducting media warfare *from the physical battlespace*, in the operational area. This makes it the purview of the US military, which is also in the operational area, to defeat this enemy capability. This is “defensive operations” in the media battlespace--defending one's constituent population from influence by the enemy. However, since the US military rightly has no means to influence its constituent population, the American people, it must rely solely on its overwhelming, asymmetric advantage in the physical battlespace to neutralize the enemy's advantage in the media battlespace.

This bears restating. The US military, because of its nature as a military in service of a democracy, has no tools for effectively conducting media warfare. It has turned to IO and PA to provide these tools and found them completely inadequate for this purpose. The US military must find new ways to leverage its overwhelming advantage in the physical battlespace to defeat this new enemy capability. The US military must understand the system that brings coverage out of the physical battlespace into the media

battlespace, challenge the enemy for control of this system, and achieve superiority. Collectors (such as stringers), reporters, and regional bureaus are the manifestation of the media in the physical battlespace. They are also the conduit by which coverage of events leaves the physical battlespace and enters the media battlespace. This is the “media system” that the US military must protect from enemy influence in order to achieve media superiority.

Facilitating Media Operations

Truth favors the US military and the best way to get the truth out is to get reporters as close to the event as possible. Reporters are the key element in the media system and proximity of reporters to an event, by embedding reporters for instance, reliably increases the incidence of news stories with context that favors the US military.²²

Reporters are trapped in their regional bureaus because there are not many of them, and it is dangerous outside their bureaus. There are not many reporters because reporters cost a lot of money and all of the other costs of running a regional bureau compete with the cost of employing reporters. The largest costs for regional bureaus are life support (housing and food) and security. Security is expensive because it is dangerous outside the regional bureau. One can see how these problems are all interrelated and conspire to keep reporters away from events. The US military must solve all of these problems if it is to get reporters closer to events.

Defer Costs for Media Outlets

One method of decreasing costs for media outlets is to provide security to regional bureaus. This does not, necessarily, mean assigning infantry platoons to each regional bureau in the operational area. It might mean simply patrolling and dominating

the “physical battlespace” around the regional bureau to create a secure “bubble” around the facility. Media outlets will like this solution because it reduces their security costs, while reporters will like the ability to leave the regional bureaus and interact with the local populace. In addition, this solution creates a perception of security in the operational area among reporters, which would inevitably be communicated in the news stories they produce. It would also have the added benefit of giving the US military some physical control of access to media bureaus, making it more difficult for insurgents to inject pictures and data into the media battlespace.

Another possible way in which the US military can defer the cost for media outlets in covering the war is by providing free transportation from the US to the operational area. The cost of moving personnel in and out of theater is a large percentage of the operating budget for regional bureaus. Currently, the US military frequently charges media outlets for air travel for no statutory or regulatory reason.²³ Helping media outlets to defer this cost allows them to put more reporters in the field.

Facilitate Reporters

Another area where the military can facilitate the media is by securing them and providing transportation to cover events. The US military already does this now, but only does so for events it wants covered. As a result, the US military usually ends up escorting a small pool of stringers who simply give pictures and data to reporters for back-page stories. This practice should be expanded and reporter-driven. The US military should secure and transport reporters to the stories that reporters want to cover.

Additionally, embedding should be a more common practice throughout Iraq, with reporters embedded with units for the longest durations possible. Currently, moving

reporters from the US to a unit in the field in Iraq is an arduous process that often consumes four to eight days of a two week trip and is partly at the expense of media outlets. This is unacceptable. Embedded reporter time on the ground with US military units is a key resource and must be maximized.

To persuade media outlets to increase embedding, the military will need to defer the costs that make this solution so expensive. This means providing transportation, body armor, communications equipment, and life support to embedded journalists (none of which is currently done when embedding reporters). This also means making it worth while for media outlets by embedding journalists in units that will be engaged in combat operations (the stories media outlets and reporters want to cover) and moving them to units as rapidly as possible.

Protecting/Targeting Media HPTs

The US military must consider the “media value” of targets when planning combat operations, just as I MEF did when they decided to seize the hospital as the initial objective in Fallujah II.²⁴ Consider the car-bomb attack on the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) headquarters in Baghdad in October of 2003.²⁵ The building provided no tactical or operational advantage to either the US or enemy from a physical perspective. But its value in the media battlespace was incalculable. The al-Rasheed hotel was impregnable by insurgents and not considered at risk in a physical sense, but with the presence of Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz, even a relatively inconsequential rocket attack (the day before the attack on the ICRC)²⁶ became a decisive operational blow to the US military. When a staff analyzes their area of operations, considering an

enemy that fights primarily in the media battlespace, locations and assets that have no tactical or operational significance take on new importance.

In doing the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), the US military identifies high value targets (HVTs--assets without which a force cannot achieve its objectives). Staffs should not just consider the physical value of assets and terrain. They should not just consider assets they or the enemy controls. They should consider the media impact of loss or even attack on every asset and every piece of terrain in their physical battlespace. This should then guide the development of their course of action.

Redefine the Role of Public Affairs

Maintaining the support of the American public is critical to maintaining freedom of action in the operational area. Whether it is described as public affairs, media operations, or some other term, the US military should seriously consider elevating operations in the media battlespace to the level of a joint warfighting function. This means more than just adding it to a bulletized list. This means integrating operations in the media battlespace into the design of all of the US military's operations in this and future wars as completely as the US military does joint fires, movement and maneuver, and sustainment now. In short, the US military should embark on its own "counterrevolution in military affairs."

Public affairs must cease to be only a strategic communicator. Nor should public affairs be relegated to a "related activity" to information operations. In light of this enemy RMA, the importance of the PAO (public affairs officer) to a staff should be at least as great as that of the effects coordinator (ECOORD), the J4, or any other

warfighting function representative. The role of public affairs should expand to at least include the following:

1. Coordinate and synchronize the provision of resources (including combat power and logistics) to the media to facilitate coverage in the operational area.
2. Act as the advocate for the media living and working in an operational area to the joint force commander and staff.
3. Integrate with the planning and execution intelligence cells to assist during intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) in assessing the media value of assets and locations in the operational area.
4. Support current operations by keeping track of where regional bureaus and reporters are in the operational area and helping to plan for their security.
5. Maintain an “IO Counterfire” cell to monitor and immediately respond to enemy disinformation attacks.

How to provide this emphasis is a question that force managers and senior DoD leaders must answer. Perhaps public affairs should become a branch of the Army, just as field artillery, infantry, and armor currently are. Perhaps advanced military education should include mandatory education of all military officers in this now vital discipline. Reporter and retired officer James Lacey suggested advanced civil schooling for selected officers in journalism.²⁷ Methods for providing this emphasis are beyond the scope of this article, but the increased emphasis is needed.

A “COUNTERREVOLUTION” IN MILITARY AFFAIRS

This enemy revolution in military affairs, the media-enabled insurgency, has created a new battlespace, the media battlespace. Yet the US military tries in vain to use

its old tools, meant for the information battlespace, to fight in this new arena. As a result, the enemy has complete freedom of maneuver in the media--“media superiority.” The US military must engage in a “counterrevolution” in military affairs in order to develop the tactics, doctrine, organization, and technology to defeat this new enemy capability, or risk fading into irrelevance.

¹ LTG Thomas F. Metz, LTC Mark W. Garrett, LTC James E. Hutton, and LTC Timothy W. Bush, “Massing Effects in the Information Domain,” *Military Review* 85, no. 3 (May-June 2006): 7-9.

² MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, *Dynamics of Military Revolution: 1300-2050* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 7.

³ US Department of Defense, Office of Force Transformation, “Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare,” (Washington, DC, 2005), 3.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 8.

⁵ U.S. Department of the Army, Center for Army Lessons Learned, *On Point: The US Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2004), 8-12.

⁶ U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters Department of the Army, FM 100-6, *Information Operations* (Washington DC, 27 August 1996), 1-2-4.

⁷ U.S. Department of Defense, Headquarters Department of Defense, JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC, 17 September 2006), GL-18.

⁸ Army, FM 100-6, 2-21

⁹ *Ibid.*, 2-9.

¹⁰ Tony Karon, “Israel and Hizballah: A Fight to the Finish?” [On-Line] Available from <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1215417,00.html>; Internet: accessed 18 February 2007.

¹¹ U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters Department of the Army, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC, December 2006), 5-1-2.

¹² U.S. Department of Defense, Headquarters Department of Defense, *Information Operations Roadmap* (Washington, DC, 3 October 2003), 26.

¹³ U.S. Department of Defense, Headquarters Joint Forces Command. JP 3-61, *Public Affairs*. (Washington, DC, May 2005), I-7-8.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, I-3.

¹⁵ Metz, 9.

¹⁶ PollingReport.com, “Iraq,” [On-line] Available from <http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq.htm>; Internet: Accessed 18 February 2007.

¹⁷ Knox., 136-145.

¹⁸ Mao Tse-tung. *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*. (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1977) vol. v, 468.

¹⁹ W. Scott Morton. *China: Its History and Culture*. (New York: McGraw-Hill Professional, 2005), 245.

²⁰ Robert Gardner, *From Talking Drums to the Internet: An Encyclopedia of Communications Technology* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 1997), 112.

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